The War on Iran: Where We Are, Where We're Going, and Why
A pause to reflect. Will the fire soon burn itself out?
Then a soldier,
Jealous in honour, sudden and quick in quarrel,
Seeking the bubble reputation
Even in the cannon’s mouth.
—Shakespeare
It’s hard to write about the current War on Iran since the situation is so fluid; hour by hour something new comes up. It’s also difficult for me to write about the war since the most valuable information I get comes from video interviews. For obvious reasons, audio and video pieces are harder to present on Substack since most people don’t have the twenty, thirty or sixty minutes to listen, no matter how useful they are.
Yet I find them instructive, so I’d like to present a summary of where we are, as of the minute I write this, and based in part on what I’ve gathered from these interviews. It’s worth memorializing the state of this pause, the image we’re frozen at now. We won’t be here long.
Short-Term Prospects: Where We Now Stand
Near-term status first. Here’s where we are:
The U.S. has attacked an Iranian-flagged cargo vessel, the Touska, in international waters, which counts as piracy. The ship’s origin was China. China has denounced the action, though I can’t find a reliable source for their exact language.
As a result, it’s uncertain that the talks in Pakistan will occur. Vance has left for the talks, but the status of the Iranian delegation is unknown. That could change.
Israel is trying to restart the war; its actions in Lebanon rival those it committed in Gaza.
According to Trump, the ceasefire expires on Wednesday. We’ll see how that goes.
Long-Term Prospects and a Divided Iran
Now long-term prospects. I personally expect the shooting war to restart. But the undiscussed wrinkle is this: Iran is divided in its leadership.
I’ve heard from several sources (all public, example here) that the military wing of the government, the IRGC, is quite hawkish and doesn’t think the war should have stopped. They are strongly opposed to any negotiation, since that doesn’t solve the problem the government, united in this, wants clearly to solve: a permanent end to the war.
Therefore, it’s easy for me to imagine that the hardline group a) wants to develop a nuclear weapon, no more delay; and b) make sure with force that Israel, the Gulf-state family dictators, and the U.S. are neutered completely, rendered unable to ever attack again.
On the other hand, the diplomats — like Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf — want to make sure that a) Iran is not seen as the aggressor or the provoking state (which explains their interest in talks); that b) Iran does not develop nuclear weapons except as a last resort (same as the pre-war Iran); that c) Chinese desire for a free flow of oil is respected (while Iran still controls the Strait); and that d) all Iranian sovereignty and rights are preserved.
This is not fatal, these differences, but they are troubling for the Iranian side. I imagine that if the Israeli-U.S. side plays its card well — provokes without provoking too much, slaughters Lebanese without overplaying that hand, builds up a massive force without firing a shot, drags the “talks” out, in other words, as long as it can, weeks, even months — that side could have Iran sitting on its heels for quite a long time.
Of course, both sides are rearming, but as in the round last year, the Israelis needed the ceasefire much more than Iran did. Advantage Israel, if the ceasefire persists unresolved.
Will Peace Break Out? Will Trump Play His Cards Well? Will Netanyahu Rein In His Blood Lust?
A good set of questions. The answers: No. No. Maybe.
Trump first. There are those who think this whole war is part of long-term grand plan. I agree that it is, but not this round of it. Put simply, Trump is out of control (not new), and Israel controls the U.S. government by the codpiece strings (also not new).
What is new is that now, before the U.S. midterm elections, while Trump still has power, is Netanyahu’s very best chance for the next several years — years — to keep the U.S. fully enmeshed in Israel’s contra-Iran project, the destruction of Iran for good using U.S. forces, and he’s going to take it. If Iran’s destruction were my goal and I were Israel, that’s what I’d do. Netanyahu will back off if he has to, but only then, and only as much as he needs to.
While Trump wants out as I see it (no news there), Netanyahu wants to keep him in. I think in that contest of wills and private inducement, Netanyahu will win. Even people like Marandi, who is careful in interviews not to ascribe motives to Trump, is open to “blackmail or the Lobby” as reasons for Trump’s behavior.
Who knows? Is it Epstein? Kushner? His own bloody mind? Insanity? It almost doesn’t matter. Trump won’t get free. He’s not a strong man; just dangerous.
Outcomes
I see only three:
Trump is stopped from within the U.S. (see here). Those odds aren’t small.
Iran stops itself, as it’s done many times before. Unlikely, but always an option, given the past.
A war erupts that escalates until Israel is gone (see here). The fire the burns itself out.
As I said before, I pray the above is wrong, but I don’t think it is. Too much has already changed.
People I Listen To
For your information, some of the interviewees I’ve been following includes these people:
Lawrence Wilkerson, ex-Army and State Department, with whom I almost completely agree. Wilkerson’s quite well connected militarily, and he’s wonderfully broad in his views and understanding. I discussed examples of excellent Wilkerson interviews here and here. (Note: Avoid the YouTube channel “Lawrence Wilkerson Updates” — it’s AI all the way down.)
Larry Johnson, ex-CIA, with whom I mostly agree.
Chas Freeman, ex-diplomat.
Alastair Crooke, former British diplomat.
John Mearsheimer, academic and political theorist.
Jeffrey Sachs, economist and academic.
Trita Parsi, academic.
Seyed Mohammad Marandi, U.S.-born Iranian journalist. As part of Iran’s negotiation team, he often has insight into Iranian thinking and reaction.
Of course, there are many others. This is truly a partial list.
Podcasts / interview programs I monitor most often include these:
Judge Andrew Napolitano: Hosts a surprisingly broad list of people, asks excellent, pointed and brief questions, and runs a tight show. Yes, he leans right (the name of the show is “Judging Freedom”), but I find little to fault in his war coverage and international understanding.
Glenn Diesen, who always has interesting guests.
Dialogue Works, hosted by Brazilian Nima Alkhorshid. A surprisingly good and consistent interview show by someone I’d never heard of before the war.
Breaking Points, hosted by Krystal Ball, Saagar Enjeti, Ryan Grim (co-founder of DropSite News) and Emily Jashinsky. A good daily watch.
Again, there are quite a few others.
A Curated Twitter List
I also have a curated Twitter list (click here to follow), that gathers a variety of voices and sources. Often when news breaks, or is about to, someone alludes to it there. Not everything said is of value, but it’s Twitter, so scrolling is fast. I regularly add and subtract to increase the list’s usefulness.
And of course, if you’d like to follow me on Twitter or Bluesky, click those links now.
Sterling work, as usual.
I think there's another factor that people have been underplaying, the economy. The West in general and the US in particular are just starting to feel the impacts that have been felt in Asia for weeks. While the US is more self sufficient in the resources that come out of the Gulf, it is not entirely so. But more importantly, those resource markets and industrial chains tend to be global in nature. Price rises and shortages property though the entire system. The US cannot insulate itself completely from the global economy. As this drags on, the economic blowback will continue to build. Eventually, it will no longer be possible for Trump to manipulate the markets with happy talking points and reality will hit. Oil will go way up and the stock market will go way down. That could happen at any time and will hit Trump in a way he cares about, possibly forcing a change in approach. We'll see.